Across Europe the defeat of Viktor Orbán has been celebrated as a victory for liberal democracy. For Hungarian liberals however, the picture is more complicated.
Newly elected prime minister Péter Magyar is by no means to be considered a liberal, nor did he win on a liberal platform; he is a pro-European conservative who managed to win the election less through ideological means and more through his critique of corruption and the overreach of Orbán’s regime.
“It is now or never. If Orbán isn't voted out now, I have no future in the country” was a common sentiment expressed by young voters ahead of the elections.
In 2026, Magyar´s momentum allowed for hope and people took to the polls.
A Medián poll (reported by Euronews ahead of the elections) found that around 75 per cent of voters under the age of 30 intended to vote for Magyar’s Tisza party (Horvath, 2026). This generational divide highlighted the extent to which younger Hungarians were eager for political change. Turnout ultimately reached 79.6 per cent, an increase of almost 10 percentage points compared with the previous election and a record in post-Communist Hungary. Ultimately, the record turnout became a defining feature of the election, as voters who had previously doubted whether Orbán could realistically be defeated came out to vote
Around 38,6% voted in favour of Orbán's Fidesz and 53,2 %for Magyar´s Tisza. Due to complex electoral rules with a mixed single-vote system, Tisza took control of over 70 percent of the seats in parliament, allowing them to efficiently drive through constitutional changes (Politpro, 2026).
Yet many young, urban Hungarians remain politically homeless. While they overwhelmingly wanted Orbán to leave office, many do not necessarily see Tisza as their ideological home. Questions such as LGBTQ+ rights, gender equality, civil liberties and European integration remain important to many of these voters. Their vote was, in many cases, strategic rather than ideological.
In the new national assembly of Hungary, liberals – and other political parties including greens and socialists – are conspicuously absent.
Ahead of the 2026 election in Hungary, it was strategically advantageous for the opposition not to have multiple parties running separately, as a divided field would have benefited Orbán. By having some parties step aside and not compete, the opposition was able to consolidate votes more effectively, increasing the chances of defeating him.
In other words: during the election, it was strategically rational for liberal parties not to compete independently. Every additional opposition list risked fragmenting the anti-Orbán vote. That strategy succeeded.
But what was an effective electoral strategy cannot become a long-term political strategy. To genuinely strengthen liberal democracy, Hungary’s future political landscape needs to be rebuilt on a broader diversity of voices and parties.
The challenge for Hungarian liberals is therefore fundamentally different today than it was in the spring of 2026. Their task is no longer primarily to remove Orbán from power but to define what liberalism should mean in post-Orbán Hungary. The political space that emerged after Orbán's defeat is still largely occupied by conservative forces. Whether Hungarian liberalism can once again become an independent political force depends not on celebrating regime change, but on articulating a vision that goes beyond simply opposing Orbán.
The upcoming four years will require strategic patience from liberals. Liberal parties should not rush into defining themselves primarily in opposition to the new government. If Péter Magyar succeeds in restoring democratic institutions, strengthening the rule of law and reducing corruption, liberals should recognise that as progress. At the same time, they must continue making the independent case for liberal values where they differ: on individual rights, minority protections, pluralism, economic openness and a society built on internationalism and freedom rather than paternalism.
Defeating an overtly illiberal regime was the first step to strengthening the liberal movement in Hungary. Ensuring that liberal ideas once again have a lasting political home may prove to be the more difficult—and ultimately more important—task.
Author: Linn Svanberg
Sources:
Horváth, F. (2026) ‘Elections in Hungary: What do the polls say?’, Euronews, 10 April. Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2026/04/10/elections-in-hungary-what-do-the-polls-say (Accessed: 21 October 2026).
PolitPro (2026) ‘Hungary’s Parliamentary Election: Results & Seat Distribution’. Available at: https://politpro.eu/en/hungary/election/parliament/2026 (Accessed: 21 October 2026).
This article was produced by a participant from the European Liberal Youth LYMEC with the financial support of the European Youth Foundation of the Council of Europe. The opinions expressed in this article are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Council of Europe.
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