When does a “strategic partnership” stop being strategic?
The world is witnessing a trend of cooperation between authoritarian regimes. The partnership between Russia and Iran, whose friendship was tested a few months ago, is no exception.
For years, Moscow and Tehran called each other strategic partners. Immediately after the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war, Iran sent Russia drones, technology, and support (Azizi, 2025). Yet when Israel and the United States struck Iran in 2026 and killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in the first hours of the operation, Moscow did not come to the aid of its friend (Sergeeva, 2026).
This article examines what that silence reveals and whether the Russia-Iran “strategic partnership” was ever the alliance it claimed to be. For the European reader, the distinction matters: understanding where genuine commitment ends and mere convenience begins shows where diplomacy and sanctions could still widen the cracks in this relationship.
Historically, Russia and Iran have never had an easy relationship, with ties between the two nations being shaped by conflict and mistrust rather than earnest friendliness. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, both countries sought ways to cooperate because their interests overlapped. Iran needed military defense, while Russia was seeking new markets for its struggling defense and nuclear industries. Soon after, Russia intensified its interest in the Middle East, and the interests of both countries intersected in Syria. Russia and Iran established common command mechanisms. They conducted joint air and ground operations and learned to coordinate effectively in a complex regional conflict.
Since the summer of 2022, Tehran has been Moscow’s main supplier of weapons. At that time, Iran was supplying Russia with Shahed-131/136 drones, which Russia called “Geran-1” and “Geran-2”. Later, Russia began producing drones in Tatarstan using Iranian technology, with an initial plan to produce 6,000 units by September 2025. It is noteworthy that the Russian side achieved this target well ahead of schedule (Altman, 2026). This cooperation is clearly asymmetrical. In return, Iran not only provides Russia with material and technical military assistance, but the parties are also allegedly actively exchanging critical intelligence gathered on the Middle Eastern and Ukrainian fronts, which helps both regimes compete with Western intelligence.
Economically, this “friendship” is also self-contradictory. Moscow and Tehran have indeed built joint trade corridors and banking systems to circumvent sanctions but, in the global market, they are rivals, not partners: both are oil and gas exporters, competing for the same Chinese buyers. Here, the true cost of this “strategic partnership” is revealed.
The “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement” signed on January 17, 2025 is a document that both sides have presented as a historic success; in fact, it lacks one of the simplest yet crucial clauses: the obligation to intervene militarily in the event of an attack on either party (Hill, 2026). For comparison, it is enough to recall the Russian-North Korean agreement signed at the same time, which contains exactly this clause – a clause which has been used by Russia to great effect. Pyongyang has already sent thousands of soldiers to the Ukrainian front to fight for Moscow under the terms of the agreement.
Moscow and Tehran have deliberately chosen a different path: close rhetoric without commitment. This choice is not an accident, but a calculated strategy by Moscow. In 2026, when a full-scale war broke out in the Middle East, the Kremlin did exactly what the treaty required of it: nothing. Russia did not send troops or directly engage in hostilities. The partnership, which for years had been measured by drones, planes, and satellites, fell silent at the war's most critical moment.
An in-depth analysis of the issue requires a different perspective from different researchers. Some researchers in academic circles believe that Russian-Iranian relations are only temporary, based on tactical interests. In contrast, other experts emphasize the practical implementation of the 2025 strategic agreement, as demonstrated at a high-level meeting in St. Petersburg on April 27, 2026. The participation of the head of Russia's military intelligence (GRU), Igor Kostyukov, and Putin's chief strategic advisor, Yuri Ushakov, demonstrates that bilateral cooperation has moved from traditional diplomatic channels to the level of special services, which implies the integration of critical intelligence data into the military-space architecture. Accordingly, the perception circulated in the Western media about Moscow’s “inaction” or “abandonment” of Iran may be superficial. The Kremlin is likely adopting an approach of “strategic patience”, within the framework of which refraining from direct military support for the regime serves both to drain US resources in the Middle East and to divert the West’s attention from the Ukrainian front, as well as to maintain Russia’s status as a regional mediator.
Nevertheless, the validity of these theoretical assumptions remains a subject of scholarly discussion. Ultimately, this alliance is based on a pragmatic geopolitical exchange: Iran is a source of practical experience in sanctions management and asymmetric warfare for Russia, while Moscow is a military-strategic pillar for Tehran, which, through the Caspian Sea and multilateral global formats, can provide Western support to create a Eurasian space protected from pressure. Accordingly, the 2025 agreement reflects not ideological unity or a classic defense alliance, but a functional partnership in which the parties leverage existing military and logistical interdependence to pursue global maneuvers and maintain their own spheres of influence.
As mentioned, both countries fear the West and are under pressure from sanctions. The West has sanctioned Russian and Iranian banks, companies, and individuals. In addition, the sanctions include a ban on the export of technology and products critical to the energy sector, asset freezes, and restrictions on oil and gas trade (Reuters, 2025). Potential targeted sanctions could undermine their infrastructure, banking integration - Mir"-"Shetab, which creates an alternative to SWIFT, and specific political figures who are carrying out military attacks. Such sanctions contradict the very points that unite them.
Both fear each other, too. One fears abandonment, the other excessive power. If we look closely, nothing has changed. American political scientist Stephen Walt's neorealist theory, which tells us about the "balance of threat", explains that states do not simply unite against a strong political actor, but they unite against what they perceive as the greatest threat, which is determined by common power, geographical proximity, and common intentions. Both states want to end Western pressure and US hegemony. This is what has brought them closer together, especially since 2022. But their partnership is superficial and is based on fear of the enemy. In particular, it is based on the fear of being abandoned by a partner and of inadvertently dragging a partner into a war. This can explain Russia's restraint during the 2026 Middle East conflict, even when the other side of the scale is losing the partner's trust (Stephen M. Walt on the U.S., Iran, and the New Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf, 2025).
Drones, satellites, and trade corridors are real, but none of them guarantee defense. This is what distinguishes Russia and Iran's relationship from Western alliances. Most of them are built not only on common benefits but also on transparent commitments and accountability, publicly verifiable and not reliant solely on the goodwill of the two regimes.
In conclusion, the Russia-Iran strategic partnership is not an alliance, but a deal. This is also evidenced by Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory. Their partnership will continue as long as a common threat - the West - unites them. Tehran fears that Moscow will abandon it when Moscow's interests demand it. We see it in 2026 in the conflict in the Middle East. Russia itself is limiting its partner: the Kremlin does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it means strengthening its ally. Economic competition, historical distrust, and mutual fear create cracks in the relationship between Iran and Russia that Europe can exploit. Diplomatic and targeted sanctions may further widen these cracks. Ultimately, "strategic partnership" sounds great in ceremonies and joint statements. But when the time comes to pay the price, in wartime, in the face of real risk, it turns out that what we call partnership is really just a convenience.
Author: Mariam Khazalia
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“This article was produced by a participant from the European Liberal Youth LYMEC with the financial support of the European Youth Foundation of the Council of Europe. The opinions expressed in this article are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Council of Europe.”
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